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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P., 
134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) 
 
Synopsis 
 
 Air pollution emissions pose a difficult problem for Congress and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1  Air pollution emitted 
in one state may travel downwind and cause harm in another state.2  
Without regulations, the downwind states suffer from the inability to 
achieve clean air because the state has no authority to regulate air 
pollution.3  To address the problem, Congress added a provision to 
the Clean Air Act (CAA), called the Good Neighbor Provision.4  The 
provision “instructs [s]tates to prohibit in-state sources ‘from 
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute 
significantly’ to downwind [s]tates’ ‘nonattainment . . . , or interfere 
with maintenance,’ of any EPA-promulgated national air quality 
standard.”5  Congress included the Good Neighbor Provision to 
establish some level of equity for downwind states by requiring 
upwind states that contribute to air pollution to reduce emissions.6  In 
interpreting the Good Neighbor Provision, the EPA adopted the 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (also called the Transport Rule) , 
which requires consideration of several factors to determine how 
much an upwind state must reduce its emissions to improve air 
quality in downwind states.7  
State and local governments, as well as industry and labor groups, 
filed a petition for review of the EPA’s interpretation of the Good 
Neighbor Provision.8  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 
                                                            
1 EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (2014). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 1598. 
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Transport Rule and held that the EPA had exceeded agency authority 
in developing the Transport Rule standards.9  The Supreme Court 
reversed the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the EPA’s 
interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision was reasonable.10 
 
Background 
 
 When air pollution is generated by a state, it is carried downwind 
across state boundaries.11  Without regulations, pollution-associated 
costs are borne by the state whose air quality is compromised, not 
necessarily by the state that produced the pollution.12 Ideally, the 
producing state would be responsible for all of the costs incurred as a 
result of the air pollution it produces, regardless of where the 
negative effects are felt; however, it is difficult to regulate for several 
reasons.13  First, it is difficult to identify from which state downwind 
pollution originated.14  Pollution from one state may be carried to 
several downwind states, some states receive pollution from several 
upwind states, and some states both generate and receive pollution.15 
Second, pollutants are chemically transformed as they travel 
downwind, which causes measurement issues for the EPA.16  The 
gasses nitrogen oxide (NOX) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) (collectively 
“upwind gasses”) often transform into ozone and fine particulate 
matter (PM2.5) (collectively “downwind gasses”).17  The challenge 
for the EPA is how to determine what amount of upwind gasses must 
be reduced to meet acceptable levels of downwind gasses.18 
In 1970, in an effort to address interstate air pollution issues, 
Congress directed the EPA to set national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS) to keep pollutant levels low to protect public 
                                                            
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1593–94. 
14 Id. at 1594. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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health.19  Once NAAQS are set, the CAA requires the EPA to 
determine locations where the concentration of pollutants exceeds the 
NAAQS (“nonattainment areas”).20  States are required to submit 
State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to the EPA within three years of 
new or updated NAAQS.21  SIPs must include adequate provisions to 
“prohibi[t] . . . any source or other type of emissions activity within 
the [s]tate from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . 
contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or therefore with 
maintenance by, any other [s]tate with respect to any . . . 
[NAAQS].”22  This CAA requirement is called the Good Neighbor 
Provision.23  If a SIP is missing or inadequate, the EPA must issue a 
Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).24 
In an effort to explain the scope of the Good Neighbor Provision, 
the EPA issued several rules that defined what it meant to “contribute 
significantly” to downwind nonattainment.25  The rule at issue, the 
Transport Rule, limited NOX and SO2 emissions from twenty-seven 
upwind states to meet downwind attainment of three NAAQS.26  
Under the Rule, the EPA used a two-step process to determine which 
states “contributed significantly” to downwind nonattainment.27 
Upwind states were required to eliminate emissions that “(1) 
produced one percent or more a NAAQS in at least one downwind 
state (step one) and (2) could be eliminated cost-effectively, as 
                                                            
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 1595 (emphasis added). 
23 Id.  The Good Neighbor Provision was first implemented in 1970 and 
revised in 1977.  Id.  The current formulation of the provision was put in place in 
1990.  Id. 
24 Id. at 1594. 
25 Id. at 1595.  In 1998, the EPA issued the NOX SIP Call rule, which limited 
NOX emission in twenty-three states.  Id.  The rule was upheld by the D.C. Circuit 
in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (2000).  In 2005, the EPA issued the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (CAIR), which regulated both NOX and SO2 emissions.  134 S. Ct. 
at 1595.  The rule was initially vacated by the D.C. Circuit, but was eventually 
upheld on rehearing in North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178 (C.A.D.C. 
2008).  The Transport Rule, issued in 2011, was the EPA’s response to the North 
Carolina decision.  134 S. Ct. at 1596. 
26 134 S. Ct. at 1596. 
27 Id. 
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determined by [the] EPA (step two).”28  For every state regulated by 
the Transport Rule, the EPA determined that the state had not 
submitted an adequate SIP, and issued a FIP if the determination was 
not challenged within sixty days.29 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling 
 
State and industry respondents petitioned for review of the 
Transport Rule in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.30  The court 
vacated the rule, holding that the EPA exceeded its statutory 
authority by issuing FIPs before states had the chance to put their 
own implementation plans into place, and by ignoring the Good 
Neighbor Provision’s limits on the EPA’s authority.31  The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether the 
D.C. Circuit had accurately construed the limits the CAA places on 
[the] EPA’s authority.”32 
 The Supreme Court disagreed  with the D.C. Circuit Court’s 
holding that states must have the chance to propose SIPs before the 
EPA issues a FIP.  The Supreme Court found that the text of the 
CAA and the Good Neighbor Provision supports the EPA’s 
interpretation that an inadequate SIP triggers the EPA’s duty to 
develop a FIP “‘at any time’ within two years.”33  The Court found 
nothing in the CAA to differentiate an inadequate SIP based on the 
Good Neighbor Provision requirements from any of the other 
requirements under the CAA.34  There is no written statutory 
exception to the triggering of a FIP, and the Court noted that the 
reviewing court’s task is “to apply the text of the statute, not to 
improve upon it.”35   
In response to the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision that the EPA’s 
two-step approach to the Good Neighbor Provision exceeded its 
                                                            
28 Id. at 1597. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1598. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1599. 
33 Id. at 1600.  
34 Id. at 1601.  
35 Id. at 1600. 
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powers under the CAA, the Supreme Court concluded that the EPA’s 
method of allocation of emission reductions was “a permissible, 
workable, and equitable interpretation.”36  The statute requires 
upwind states “to eliminate those ‘amounts’ of pollution that 
‘contribute significantly to nonattainment’ in downwind States.”37  In 
light of the absence of statutory direction regarding how to reduce 
upwind emissions in only those amounts, the Supreme Court applied 
Chevron deference38 to the EPA’s interpretation.39  The statutory 
ambiguity allowed the EPA to use its discretion to find a reasonable 
solution.40  The court of appeals believed that the Good Neighbor 
Provision included a proportionality requirement on emission 
restrictions.41  However, nothing in the text of the statute forces the 
EPA to make its determinations based on a state’s proportional 
contribution to the problem.42  The Supreme Court rejected the D.C. 
Circuit’s determination and gave deference to the EPA’s authority to 
reasonably interpret the Good Neighbor Provision of the CAA.43   
 
Dissent 
 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that 
the Good Neighbor Provision “specified quite precisely the 
responsibility of an upwind [s]tate,” and that unelected agency 
personnel exercised inappropriate lawmaking authority by requiring 
pollution reductions on the basis of cost-effectiveness rather than in 
proportion to the amount of pollutants each state produces.44  They 
recognized that regulating the problem of interstate pollution is 
                                                            
36 Id. at 1610. 
37 Id. at 1603 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012)). 
38 Chevron deference is a two-step process used to answer questions of 
statutory construction in administrative law.  Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  If the statute’s intent is unambiguous, 
then the statute’s construction controls.  Id. at 842–43.  If the statute’s intent is 
ambiguous, then the agency’s construction controls.  Id. 
39 134 S.Ct. at 1604.  
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 1610.  
44 Id. 
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“complex and difficult,” but argued that the problem may not be 
regulated by the EPA in a manner inconsistent with the 
administrative structure enacted by Congress, regardless of the 
seriousness of the problem.45   
 
Impact 
 
 In this case, the Supreme Court determined the EPA’s authority 
to interpret and enforce the CAA.  It was a straightforward 
application of Chevron deference to allow the EPA the freedom to 
reasonably interpret ambiguous provisions in the CAA.  While the 
Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals, the Supreme 
Court was not attempting to defend the practicality of the EPA’s 
actions.  Even though the EPA may not be utilizing the best methods 
of enforcing the Good Neighbor Provision of the CAA, the Supreme 
Court noted that it is not the role of the courts to improve upon 
statutes.46  It is up to the legislature to determine which statutory 
limits and requirements need to be placed on the EPA within the 
CAA standards.  Here, the Supreme Court addressed the conflicting 
viewpoints of the legislature and judiciary and found that the EPA 
was acting within agency authority. 
 
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 
134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) 
 
Synopsis 
 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act47 allows U.S. citizens and 
lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to petition for spouses, siblings, 
and minor children to obtain immigrant visas.48  A sponsored 
individual is referred to as the petition’s principal beneficiary.49  If 
the principal beneficiary has any unmarried children under the age of 
twenty-one, those children (called derivative beneficiaries) are 
                                                            
45 Id. at 1621. 
46 Id. at 1600.  
47 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012). 
48 Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio, 134 S.Ct. 2191, 2196 (2014). 
49 Id. 
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allowed the same immigration status and order of consideration of 
the parent—meaning when a visa becomes available to a principal 
beneficiary, a visa also automatically becomes available to any 
derivative beneficiary as well.50  However, since the immigration 
process can take years to complete, some beneficiaries (both 
principal and derivative) reach age twenty-one—and therefore “age 
out”—after the sponsoring petition was filed and a visa became 
available, but before completing the immigration process.51  In that 
situation, the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA)52 ensures that the 
time spent processing immigration papers does not count against the 
beneficiary in determining his or her status.53  But sometimes a 
beneficiary ages out while waiting for a visa to become available.54   
In this case, the Supreme Court determined whether the CSPA 
provides a remedy to beneficiaries who were under age twenty-one 
when the sponsoring petition was filed, but aged out before a visa 
became available.55  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
interpreted the CSPA as providing relief to only beneficiaries who 
did or could have qualified as principal beneficiaries.56  The Ninth 
Circuit reversed the BIA’s determination, finding that the CSPA was 
unambiguous and granted automatic conversion to all aged out 
derivative beneficiaries.57  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
overturned the Ninth Circuit decision, deferring to the BIA’s 
construction of the statute. 58 
 
Background 
 
 An immigrant visa is a “highly sought-after document” because it 
is required for aliens to enter and permanently reside in the United 
States.59  Not everyone may obtain an immigration visa; under the 
                                                            
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002). 
53 134 S. Ct. at 2196. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 2196–97. 
56 Id. at 2197. 
57 Id. at 2202.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 2197. 
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Immigration and Nationality Act, a person must fall into one of six 
immigration categories to be considered. One of those categories is 
for immediate relatives; the remaining five categories are for 
“family-sponsored” immigrants, which includes more distant 
relatives of U.S. citizens.60  In order to obtain an immigration visa, 
the sponsoring U.S. citizen must file a petition for the principal 
beneficiary.61  If the principal beneficiary is an immediate family 
member, then he or she receives the visa as soon as the sponsoring 
petition is approved; however, if the principal beneficiary falls into 
one of the family-sponsored categories, then approval of the 
sponsoring petition gets the beneficiary a place in line for a visa.62  
The principal beneficiary’s status also applies to any derivative 
beneficiaries.63   
The time it takes between approval of the sponsoring petition and 
receipt of a visa can take many months or years.64  There are a 
maximum number of visas allowed in a year for each family-
sponsored category, and the demand for visas usually exceeds the 
supply.65  Because of the amount of time it takes between petition 
approval and availability of a visa, many people who qualified for a 
visa when the petition was approved age out and are no longer 
qualified when the visa becomes available. 
Congress enacted the CSPA to address the treatment of “once-
but-no-longer-minor aliens.”66  Section 1151(f)(1) allows immediate 
relatives to use their age as of the petition filing date to determine 
whether they satisfy the age requirements.67  Section 1153(h)(1) 
explains how to determine the age of an alien seeking to immigrate 
under one of the other immigration categories.68  Under this section, 
an alien cannot age out because of bureaucratic delays, but time spent 
simply waiting for a visa to become available is included in the age 
                                                            
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 2198. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 2199. 
65 Id. at 2198. 
66 Id. at 2199. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 2200. 
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determination.69  If a beneficiary ages out before a visa becomes 
available, section 1153(h)(3) automatically converts the beneficiary’s 
petition to an “appropriate category.”70  The BIA considered the 
meaning of section 1153(h)(3) in Matter of Wang.71   
Wang was the principal beneficiary of a family preference visa 
that his U.S. citizen sister filed for him in 1992.72  At the time, Wang 
had a ten-year-old daughter who qualified as a derivative 
beneficiary.73  Wang waited for a visa for over a decade and by the 
time one was available, his daughter was twenty-two, and therefore 
too old to qualify as a child derivative beneficiary to Wang.74  Wang 
used the visa to travel to the United States and became a legal 
permanent resident.75  He then filed a new petition for his daughter, 
with himself as the legal sponsor instead of his sister.76  Wang argued 
that under the CSPA, his daughter’s petition should automatically 
convert and she should be able to retain the original priority date.77  
The BIA rejected the argument, stating that the statute doesn’t 
expressly state which petitions qualify for automatic conversion, and 
thus applied its own administrative discretion in the face of the 
statutory ambiguity.78  The BIA looked to the “recognized meaning” 
of the words “automatic conversion” in immigration law.79  
According to the BIA, this language only applied when a petition 
could “move seamlessly from one family preference category to 
another—not when a new sponsor was needed to fit a beneficiary 
into a different category.”80  There was no indication that Congress 
intended to expand the use of the “automatic conversion” concept in 
immigration procedures.81  Because Wang’s daughter did not have a 
                                                            
69 Id. at 2200–01. 
70 Id. at 2201 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012)). 
71 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (2009). 
72 134 S. Ct. at 2201. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 2202. 
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qualifying relationship with the original visa sponsor, her petition 
could not “automatically convert,” and she had to go to the start of 
the visa availability line.82   
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling 
 
Respondents in this case are the principal beneficiaries of family-
sponsored petitions filed by U.S. citizens (a parent in one case, and a 
sibling in the other case).83  Each respondent also had a child who 
was under the age of twenty-one at the time the petition was filed, 
and was therefore considered a derivative beneficiary.84  But by the 
time visas became available, all of the respondents’ derivative 
beneficiaries were over twenty-one and were unable to obtain visas.85  
Respondents immigrated to the United States without their children, 
and then filed petitions for them, arguing that they should receive the 
same priority date as the original petitions.86  The U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services denied their requests and placed the 
children at the start of the priority line.87  The parents brought a 
suit.88 
The District Court applied the BIA’s interpretation of section 
1153(h)(3) in Wang, and granted summary judgment to the 
Government.89  The Ninth Circuit first affirmed the judgment, but 
granted rehearing en banc and reversed, concluding that the statute 
was unambiguous and the BIA was not entitled to deference.90  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit 
split on the meaning of the statute.91 The Court overturned the Ninth 
Circuit, holding that the statutory ambiguity required deference to the 
expert interpretation of the implementing agency, the BIA.92 
                                                            
82 Id. at 2201. 
83 Id. at 2202. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 2203. 
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 The Court applied Chevron deference93 to the BIA’s 
interpretation of section 1153(h)(3).94  The statute is ambiguous 
because it “addresses the issue in divergent ways,” making it possible 
to come to alternative reasonable conclusions.95  The first part of 
section 1153(h)(3) reads: “If the age of an alien is determined under 
paragraph (1) to be [twenty-one] years of age or older . . . .”96 This is 
a condition that all aged-out beneficiaries meet.97  But the second part 
of the section states: “[T]he alien’s petition shall automatically be 
converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the 
original priority date issued upon receipt of the original position.”98  
This clause instructs immigration officials to “convert” the 
beneficiary’s petition from a category for children to an 
“appropriate” adult category.99  The conversion is a change in 
category only, not a change in petition or sponsor.100  Therefore, only 
beneficiaries whose petitions can be automatically converted into a 
different category—beneficiaries who retain qualifying relationships 
with their sponsor before and after turning twenty-one—are covered 
by the section despite the inclusive language at the beginning of the 
section.101 
The respondents’ children in this case did not retain qualifying 
beneficiary status after turning twenty-one because, although the 
respondents themselves were principal beneficiaries of the sponsors, 
their children only counted as derivative beneficiaries while they 
were still under twenty-one.102 Once they reached twenty-one, they 
                                                            
93 Chevron deference is a two-step process used to answer questions of 
statutory construction in administrative law.  Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  If the statute’s intent is unambiguous, 
then the statute’s construction controls.  Id. at 842–43.  If the statute’s intent is 
ambiguous, then the agency’s construction controls.  Id. 
94 134 S. Ct. at 2203. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2203–04. 
100 Id. at 2204. 
101 Id. at 2206. 
102 Id. at 2206–07. 
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were merely grandchildren of the sponsors, which is not a 
relationship that warrants family preference under U.S. immigration 
law.103  For the children to fit into a new category, they must find 
new sponsors, which does not qualify as “automatic conversion.”104 
The Court held that section 1153(h)(3)’s language permitted the 
IAB to discriminate between aged-out beneficiaries, but did not 
require discrimination.105  Because of the section’s ambiguity, the 
IAB had to option to decide how to interpret it.106  Because the IAB’s 
decision was a reasonable interpretation of the statute, the Court must 
defer to the interpretation.107 
 
Concurrence 
 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the 
judgment, agreeing with most of the plurality’s opinion.108  However, 
the Chief Justice disagreed with the plurality’s suggestion that 
deference was warranted because of a conflict between the two parts 
of section 1153(h)(3).109  He explained that deference should be 
given to an agency’s interpretation because it is presumed that 
Congress intended to give responsibility to the agency to resolve 
ambiguity in the statute, not because the statute directly contradicts 
itself.110  “Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute 
that does not make sense.”111  But in this case, Roberts did not 
believe that section 1153(h)(3) had conflicting clauses; rather, the 
first clause stated a condition and did not actually grant relief to 
anyone.112  The second clause was the “operative provision” that 
explained what an aged-out beneficiary was entitled to.113  
Regardless, since the interpretation offered by the BIA was 
                                                            
103 Id. at 2207. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 2214. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 2215. 
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reasonable and consistent with the ordinary meaning of the statute, 
Roberts concurred with the plurality’s holding.114 
 
Justice Alito’s Dissent 
 
Justice Alito disagreed with the plurality’s opinion because he 
believed the statute made a clear point: “If the age of an alien is 
determined under [§ 1153(h)(3)] to be [twenty-one] years of age or 
older . . . , the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the 
appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority 
date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”115  With such a 
clear statutory command, Justice Alito argued, the BIA was not free 
to come up with a contradictory interpretation.116 
 
Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent 
 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer and Justice Thomas, 
disagreed with the plurality’s opinion because section 1153(h)(3) 
“provides a clear answer” to the question of which aged-out children 
are entitled to retain priority dates: aged-out children are entitled to 
retain their priority dates as long as they are “‘determined to be 
[twenty-one] years of age or older for purposes of’ derivative 
beneficiary status.”117  Based on that language, all aged-out children 
that qualified under the CSPA satisfy the condition would be entitled 
to retain their priority dates.118  
Notwithstanding the “unambiguous” language in the clause, 
Justice Sotomayor argued that the plurality allowed the BIA to 
interpret section 1153(h)(3) without regard to the “obvious ways in 
which [the section could] operate as a coherent whole and instead 
construe[d] the statute as a self-contradiction . . . .”119  Because 
Chevron deference should be applied to cases in which the statute is 
insufficiently specific or diametrically opposed, deference was 
                                                            
114 Id. at 2215–16. 
115 Id. at 2216 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012)). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 2216–17 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012)). 
118 Id. at 2217. 
119 Id. 
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inappropriately applied in this case, according to Justice 
Sotomayor.120  The Court should have applied a straightforward 
interpretation of the statute, without resorting to agency deference.121 
 
Impact 
 
 “This is the kind of case Chevron was built for.”122  The Supreme 
Court utilized this key deference principle to clarify the roles of the 
administrative agency and the courts.  While Congress may have 
meant to imply that minor derivative beneficiaries would be eligible 
for the CSPA remedy, they failed to legislate clearly.123  Due to the 
potential legislative oversight, the administrative agency operated 
within its authority to understand and interpret the law in a 
reasonable manner.124  The BIA “chose a textually reasonable 
construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies 
underlying immigration law,” and the Court saw no reason to assume 
control over the agency’s expert authority.125  However, the BIA’s 
determination of CSPA qualifications has far reaching consequences 
for the already tumultuous immigration process.126  The correct 
means for addressing the issue and seeking a remedy for derivative 
beneficiaries who have aged out of the process is through legislation 
with such inclusive language.   
 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
 
Synopsis 
 
Owners of closely held corporations brought action against the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), seeking to enjoin the demand of 
                                                            
120 Id. at 2219–20. 
121 Id. at 2228. 
122 Id. at 2213. 
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 See id., Part B, at 2199–2202. 
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the Patient Protections and Affordable Care Act (ACA) that the 
corporations provide health-insurance coverage for certain 
contraceptives.127  The corporations were owned by families with 
sincere Christian beliefs that life begins at conception.128  They 
argued that it would violate their religious beliefs to facilitate access 
to contraceptive methods that they believed caused abortions.129  The 
RFRA “prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that 
substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action 
constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling 
government interest.”130  In this case, the question for the Supreme 
Court was whether the HHS was allowed to force the corporations to 
provide insurance coverage for contraceptive methods under the 
RFRA.131 
First, the Court determined that corporations constitute “persons” 
under the RFRA, and therefore the RFRA applied to the case.132  
Then, applying the RFRA to the ACA mandate, the Court held that, 
although the HHS’s mandate served a compelling government 
interest, the contraceptive regulations substantially burdened the 
exercise of religion and did not constitute the least restrictive means 
of serving the government’s compelling interest in ensuring access to 
healthcare.133    
 
Background 
 
 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
 
The RFRA was enacted in 1993 to “provide very broad protection 
for religious liberty.”134  In Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,135 the Supreme Court rejected 
                                                            
127 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–66 (2014). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 2759. 
130 Id. (emphasis added). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 2768. 
133 Id. at 2759. 
134 Id. at 2760. 
135 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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the test that had formerly been used to determine whether 
government actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.136  Congress enacted the RFRA137 in response to Smith 
to ensure that the government could not “substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability.”138  Under the RFRA, the government may not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless the 
government can demonstrate that the burden: (1) furthers a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that interest.139   
 
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
 
In general, the ACA “requires employers with [fifty] or more 
full-time employees to offer ‘a group health plan or group health 
insurance coverage’ that provides ‘minimum essential coverage.’”140 
“Minimum essential coverage” includes coverage for preventive care 
and screenings for women, which includes “approved contraceptive 
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling.”141  Covered employers who do not provide the required 
coverage are charged a significant fee.142  Certain religious 
                                                            
136 134 S. Ct. at 2760.  The Court in Smith rejected a balancing test that 
considered “whether the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the 
practice of religion, and if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling 
interest.”  Id.  In Smith, two Native American Church members were denied 
unemployment benefits after they were fired for consuming peyote.  Id.  Although 
their peyote consumption was for religious purposes, the state denied 
unemployment benefits because peyote consumption was a crime.  Id.  The Court 
upheld the state’s decision, reasoning that “neutral, generally applicable laws may 
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling 
government interest.”  Id. at 2760–61. 
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to -4 (2012). 
138 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 2762 (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(f)(2), 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2012)). 
141 Id. (quoting 77 Fed. Reg. 8725).  Congress did not specify what “preventive 
care” included, but instead authorized the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) to make that determination.  Id.  The HRSA produced the 
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines in 2011.  Id. 
142 Id.  Covered employers who provide inadequate coverage may be charged 
up to $100 per day per inadequately-covered individual.  Id.  Covered employers 
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employers and religious nonprofit organizations are exempted from 
the contraceptive coverage requirement.143   
Although most contraceptive methods prevent egg fertilization, 
the methods of contraception at issue in these cases prevent 
pregnancy by inhibiting a fertilized egg from attaching to the 
uterus.144  This method of contraception is akin to abortion by some 
religious groups.145 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling 
 
Facts 
 
In the first case, the Hahn family, devout Mennonites, owned and 
operated a closely held for-profit corporation called Conestoga Wood 
Specialties.146  The Hahns were the sole owners of the corporation; 
they controlled the board of directors and held all of the company’s 
voting shares.147  They sought to operate their business in a way that 
reflected their Christian beliefs, which included the belief that human 
life begins at conception.148  Therefore, they refused to provide health 
insurance coverage for the types of contraceptive methods they 
considered abortifacients.149 They sued the HHS under the RFRA in 
an effort to enjoin the application of the ACA’s contraceptive 
coverage requirement insofar as it required Conestoga to provide 
coverage for the types of contraception that violated the Hahns’s 
religious beliefs.150  The district court denied a preliminary 
injunction, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.151 
In the second case, the Green family was a Christian family that 
owned two for-profit businesses: a Christian bookstore called 
                                                            
who do not provide health coverage at all may be required to pay up to $2,000 per 
year for each full-time employee.  Id. 
143 Id. at 2763. 
144 Id. at 2762. 
145 Id. at 2759. 
146 Id. at 2764. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 2764–65. 
150 Id. at 2765. 
151 Id. 
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Mardel, and a nationwide chain arts-and-crafts store called Hobby 
Lobby.152 The Green family retained sole control over both 
corporations.153  Like the Hahns, the Greens ran their companies in 
accordance with their religious beliefs.154  All Mardel and Hobby 
Lobby stores closed on Sunday, and they did not sell products that 
facilitated or promoted alcohol consumption.155  They also 
contributed company profits to Christian missionaries and 
ministries.156  Since they believed that some of the contraceptive 
methods required under the ACA operated in violation of their 
religious beliefs, they too sued the HHS under the RFRA in an effort 
to enjoin the application of the ACA’s contraceptive coverage 
requirement insofar as it required Mardel and Hobby Lobby to 
provide coverage for the types of contraception that violated their 
religious beliefs.157  The district court denied a preliminary 
injunction.158  Contrary to the Third Circuit’s decision, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that the 
contraceptive coverage requirement was a substantial burden on the 
exercise of religion, and that the HHS had failed to show a 
compelling interest.159  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
address the circuit split.160 
 
Corporate Personhood 
 
The RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially 
burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless it is in furtherance of 
a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that interest.161  The first issue was to determine whether 
the three for-profit corporations constituted “persons” under the 
                                                            
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 2766. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id.  
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RFRA.162  Since the RFRA does not define the term “person,” the 
Court applied the Dictionary Act163 definition:  a “person” includes 
“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, 
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”164  The Court 
found that there was no intent in the passing of the RFRA to depart 
from the Dictionary Act definition of person, which includes 
corporations.165  The Court also considered RFRA claims brought by 
nonprofit corporations in several cases,166 thus demonstrating that a 
nonprofit corporation may be considered a person under the 
RFRA.167  The HHS conceded that a nonprofit corporation may be a 
“person” within the meaning of the RFRA, and the Court did not find 
any clear distinction between for-profit and nonprofit corporations 
that would allow one to retain “personhood” rights under the RFRA 
while denying the other.168   
The HHS argued that for-profit corporations were not covered by 
the RFRA because they could not exercise religion.169  They first 
argued that the RFRA was essentially a codification of the pre-Smith 
Free Exercise balancing test, and because none of the pre-Smith cases 
held that a for-profit corporation had free-exercise rights, free-
exercise protection does not extend to RFRA cases.170  The Court 
rejected this argument, mainly because nothing in the RFRA suggests 
that it was meant to codify the pre-Smith rule.171 
The HHS also argued that for-profit corporations were not 
covered by the RFRA because determining the sincere religious 
                                                            
162 Id. at 2768–69. 
163 “[The Court must] look to the Dictionary Act . . . ‘[i]n determining the 
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.’” Id. at 
2768 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
164 Id. at 2768; 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
165 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
166 See, i.e., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficenta Uniao de 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
167 134 S. Ct. at 2769. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 2772. 
171 Id. 
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beliefs of large, publicly traded for-profit corporations would be so 
difficult as a practical matter that Congress could not have intended 
the RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations.172  The Court found, 
however, that because the corporations at issue in this case were 
closely held and entirely owned by members of individual families, 
the sincerity of their religious views was easily discernable.173  
Therefore, the Court held that “a federal regulation’s restriction on 
the activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply 
with [the] RFRA.”174   
 
Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise 
 
Because it determined that the RFRA applied in this case, the 
Court next addressed whether the contraceptive coverage 
requirement placed a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.175  
The Court entertained two arguments from the HHS.176  First, the 
HHS argued that the ACA mandate requiring employers to either 
provide healthcare coverage or face a financial penalty did not 
constitute a substantial burden because the penalty was less than the 
cost of providing health insurance to employees.177  The Court 
rejected this argument finding that the HHS’s claim was unsupported 
and the burden would be a competitive disadvantage to the 
corporation.178   
The HHS’s second argument was that the connection between 
providing healthcare coverage for contraception and the morally 
objectionable action (destruction after conception) was too 
attenuated.179  The Court held that this argument wrongly addressed 
the issue of whether the religious belief asserted was reasonable 
rather than addressing whether the HHS demand placed a substantial 
                                                            
172 Id. at 2774. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 2775. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 2775–79.  
177 Id. at 2776. 
178 Id. at 2777. 
179 Id. 
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burden on religious exercise.180  Traditionally, the Court has held that 
a sincere religious belief that sets a moral standard must only be 
found to reflect an “honest conviction” to qualify as religious 
exercise.181  The Court found that there was a substantial burden on 
the corporations to either provide health insurance or face a heavy 
financial penalty that violated a sincerely held religious conviction.182   
 
Compelling Government Interest and Least Restrictive Means  
 
Once the Court found that the HHS imposed a substantial burden 
on the religious exercise of the corporations, the Court next evaluated 
whether the HHS showed that their demand “(1) [was] in furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [was] the least 
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”183  The Court found it unnecessary to adjudicate the first 
part of the issue, and assumed that the interest in providing cost-free 
access to contraception for employees under employer-provided 
group health plans constituted a compelling government interest.184  
The Court chose instead to consider the second half of the test, 
whether the contraceptive mandate was the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling government interest.185  Noting the 
“exceptionally demanding” nature of the least-restrictive means 
standard, the Court argued that the least restrictive way of providing 
contraception coverage would be for the government to pay for it.186  
It is likely that the cost to allow closely held corporations to defer the 
cost of certain contraceptives to the government would be minor, as 
the government has already taken on a heavy financial burden 
through the passage of the ACA.187  This would alleviate the burden 
on the individual corporations while still ensuring contraceptive 
                                                            
180 Id. at 2778. 
181 Id. at 2779. 
182 Id.  
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 2780. 
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 2781. 
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coverage.188  While the Court cannot make decisions to create new 
programs, the Court still used that analysis to determine that the HHS 
did not employ the least restrictive means in furthering its 
governmental interest.189  Thus, the Court’s final determination was 
that “the contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held 
corporations, violate[d the] RFRA.”190   
 
Dissent 
 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and 
Kagan, disagreed with the majority’s opinion.191  Ginsburg first 
argued that the corporations did not have Free Exercise Clause claims 
because, under Smith, “the ACA’s contraceptive coverage 
requirement applies generally, it is ‘otherwise valid,’ it trains on 
women’s well[-]being, not on the exercise of religion, and any effect 
it has on such exercise is incidental.”192  But even if Smith did not 
control, Ginsburg said, an exemption would not be granted to the 
corporations because it would “significantly impinge on the interests 
of third parties” by overriding the interests of employees and their 
covered dependents, who would not necessarily hold the same 
religious convictions.193   
Ginsburg then argues that the corporations’ RFRA claims must 
fail because the RFRA was simply a codification of pre-Smith law 
and therefore did not create any new rights.194  If one referred to the 
pre-Smith body of law, Ginsburg argued, then each step of the 
analysis would have been determined differently, and the Court 
would have found that there was no satisfactory alternative that 
would have served the government’s compelling interests.195 
 
 
                                                            
188 Id. at 2780. 
189 Id. at 2781–82. 
190 Id. at 2785. 
191 Id. at 2787. 
192 Id. at 2790 (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. V. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990)). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 2791. 
195 Id. at 2793–2803. 
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Impact 
 
 Considered “the most controversial Supreme Court decision” in 
2014,  this case was heavily politicized and drew attention to the 
political divisiveness of the decision.196  This decision is an important 
clarification of the recently implemented ACA and could lead to 
further suits brought by other closely held corporations seeking 
exemption from providing insurance coverage of certain healthcare 
procedures.  One practical implication of this decision is the fact that 
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga Wood Specialties may now 
refuse to cover certain types of contraceptives under their employer 
group health insurance, which sets a precedent for more closely held 
corporation exceptions to the ACA. More litigation will likely arise 
now that the Supreme Court has ruled on one aspect of the 
relationship between the ACA and the RFRA in employer provided 
group insurance plans.   
 
 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
 
Atrium Medical Center v. United States Department of  
Health and Human Services, 
766 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2014) 
 
Synopsis 
 
 Two groups of hospitals challenged calculations the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) used to 
determine how much each hospital was paid for inpatient services 
under Medicare Part A.197  Two types of programs were at issue: a 
short-term disability program and a part-time weekend work program 
(Baylor Plan).198  The hospitals opposed the Secretary’s decision to 
include the hours associated with each program in the calculations for 
                                                            
196 Richard A. Epstein, The Defeat of the Contraceptive Mandate in Hobby 
Lobby: Right Results, Wrong Reasons, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 35 (2013–
2014). 
197 Atrium Med. Ctr. v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 766 
F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2014).  
198 Id. 
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inpatient services reimbursements.199  The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to support the 
Secretary’s determination to include the programs’ hours. 200 
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling 
 
Background 
 
Under Medicare Part A, a fixed, predetermined formula called the 
prospective payment system is used to determine how much hospitals 
are reimbursed for inpatient medical services.201  Section 
1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i) of the Medicare Act requires the Secretary to 
adjust reimbursements to account for differences in the cost of labor 
in a given area.202  The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) evaluates reports submitted by each hospital to determine the 
hospital’s labor costs.203  The data is used to calculate the average 
cost of labor in a given area—called the wage index—and that 
amount is used to establish the nationwide federal rate and make 
regional adjustments.204  “Wages,”205 “wage-related costs,”206 and 
“paid hours”207 make up the components of the wage index.208  
Hospitals prefer to report fewer paid hours because paid hours lower 
the region’s index and result in decreased reimbursement for 
inpatient services.209 Since wage costs are tied to paid hours, a 
                                                            
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i) (2012). 
203 Atrium, 766 F.3d at 564.  
204 Id. at 564–65. 
205 “‘Wages’ are . . . the dollar value of every hour the hospital paid its 
employees.”  Id. at 565. 
206 “‘Wage-related costs’ are essentially fringe benefits, like health insurance 
and retirement plans, and are not linked to paid hours.”  Id. 
207 “‘Paid hours’ are the actual hours associated with an employee’s wages 
rather than simply the amount of time an employee spent working at the hospital; 
for example, paid hours includes ‘paid lunch hours’ and ‘paid holiday, vacation, 
and sick leave hours.’”  Id. 
208 Id. at 564.  Here is a simplified version of the formula used to calculate the 
wage index: (wages + wage-related costs) / (paid hours).  Id. at 565. 
209 Id. 
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hospital would not want to report a cost as a wage that other hospitals 
in the same region reported as a wage-related cost because it would 
lower the hospital’s wage index in comparison to the other hospitals 
in the region.210 
 
Standards of Review 
 
The Secretary’s decision to count short-term disability payments 
and Baylor Plan payments in her determination of reimbursement 
adjustments for that region was reviewed de novo.211  First, the court 
determined that the treatment of program payments was entitled to 
Chevron deference,212 following Congress’s intention to grant 
exceptionally broad discretion to the Secretary in defining “wages,” 
“wage-related,” and “paid hours.”213  Then, the court determined that 
the Secretary’s decision also merited Auer deference214 to determine 
whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious.  Thus, the Secretary 
had discretion to formulate the wage index as long as she did not 
arbitrarily treat the same input differently for different hospitals.215  
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Secretary’s construction of the 
Medicare Act was neither contrary to the statute nor arbitrary or 
capricious.216  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 566. 
212 Chevron deference is a two-step process used to answer questions of 
statutory construction in administrative law.  Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  If the statute’s intent is unambiguous, 
then the statute’s construction controls. Id. at 842–43.  If the statute’s intent is 
ambiguous, then the agency’s construction controls.  Id. 
213  766 F.3d at 566. 
214 Even if an agency’s interpretation of a statute controls under Chevron, the 
interpretation may nevertheless be rejected if it is arbitrary or capricious.  Id. at 
567.  Under Auer, the agency’s interpretation is controlling unless it is “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). 
215 Id. at 569.  
216 Id. at 575. 
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The Secretary’s Decision: Short-Term Disability Payments 
 
Most hospitals have insurance to cover short-term disability 
payments, and those insurance premiums are considered “wage-
related” costs.217  However, some hospitals, including plaintiffs in 
this case, choose instead to make short-term disability payments out 
of general funds through the payroll process.218  This process requires 
accounting for more paid hours, which lowers the wage index 
determination for that hospital group and ultimately produces lower 
reimbursements.219  The plaintiffs alleged that treating typical 
insurance premiums as “wage-related” and short-term disability 
payments made through general funds as “wages” was an 
inconsistent treatment of costs, violating the Medicare Act’s mandate 
that the wage index be uniform and consistent.220  
The Sixth Circuit relied on the decision in Barnhart, in which the 
Supreme Court granted Chevron deference to the Social Security 
Administration to interpret details of the Social Security Act’s 
administration because the Act was complex, broadly applicable, and 
required agency expertise.221  The Sixth Circuit applied the same 
analysis in this case, and held that the Secretary’s interpretation of 
the Medicare Act as it applied to classifying non-insurance short-
term disability payments did not obviously conflict with the 
statute.222  Even though insurance programs were treated differently 
from non-insurance programs, because hospitals using the non-
insurance short-term disability payment process were not treated 
differently than similarly situated hospitals that used insurance to 
make short-term disability payments, there was no violation of the 
Medicare Act’s uniformity requirement.223  The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holding that the Secretary’s 
                                                            
217 Id. at 570. 
218 Id. 
219 Id.  
220 Id.  
221 Id. at 573 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002)). 
222 Id.  
223 Id.  
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determination of the Medicare Act was not manifestly contrary and 
that her reasoning was neither arbitrary nor capricious.224  
 
The Secretary’s Decision: Baylor Plan Hours 
 
In order to encourage weekend work, many hospitals offer an 
arrangement referred to as the “Baylor Plan,” which grants a full-
time salary and accompanying benefits to an individual who works 
two weekend shifts.225  An employee who works two twelve-hour 
weekend shifts is to be paid as a full-time employee; therefore, the 
payroll records forty paid hours per week for that individual.226   
The plaintiffs in this case challenged the determination that the 
unworked hours in the Baylor Plan were to be counted as “paid 
hours” and included in the wage index calculation.227  Unlike Baylor 
Plan hours, bonuses and overtime hours are not considered “paid 
hours,” and thus are not included in the wage index.228  Plaintiffs 
argued that unworked Baylor Plan hours were merely an accounting 
mechanism to calculate the premium per hour incentive for 
employees who worked these undesirable shifts.229  The Secretary 
defended the categorization of Baylor Plan hours as paid hours, 
stating that paid hours are a more appropriate reflection of an 
employee’s salary, and recording the non-worked hours as paid hours 
allowed employees to receive full-time benefits.230   
Because there was no question of statutory construction, the court 
applied Auer, rather than Chevron, deference to the Secretary’s 
decision.231  The court found that defining Baylor Plan hours as “paid 
hours” rather than some version of bonuses was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious because it was an accurate representation of the reality of 
the Baylor Plan and how the hospitals themselves treated Baylor Plan 
                                                            
224 Id.  
225 Id. at 574. 
226 Id.  
227 Id.  
228 Id. at 574–75. 
229 Id. at 575. 
230 Id. 
231 Id.; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).  
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employees as full-time employees.232  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s holding.233 
 
Impact 
 
 Classification of expenses is crucial to hospitals that serve a 
significant portion of patients relying on Medicare coverage.  The 
more paid hours a hospital has to report, the lower its region’s wage 
index; a lower index equates to lower reimbursement for inpatient 
services.234  A hospital would therefore prefer to report as few paid 
hours as possible, or at least refrain from reporting something as 
“wage” that other hospitals are reporting as “wage-related.”235  With 
such a large proportion of the federal budget allocated for Medicare 
coverage, and approximately 54 million people benefiting from that 
coverage236, the reimbursement of Medicare funds is a far-reaching 
complexity requiring the Sixth Circuit to “grapple with some of ‘the 
most completely impenetrable texts within human experiences,’ 
statutes and regulations that ‘one approaches at the level of 
specificity herein demanded with dread.’”237  It is likely that further 
examinations of these “impenetrable texts” will continue to reach the 
courts due to the need for greater clarification.   
 
Avila v. Los Angeles Police Department, 
758 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014) 
 
Synopsis 
 
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court 
decision in favor of Leonard Avila, a former Los Angeles Police 
Officer.238  Avila claimed that he was fired from the Los Angeles 
                                                            
232 Atrium, 766 F.3d at 575. 
233 Id.  
234 Id.  
235 Id.  
236 Medicare at a Glance, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Sept. 
2, 2014), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-at-a-glance-fact-sheet/. 
237 Atrium, 766 F.3d at 564 (quoting Rehab Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 
1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994)).   
238 Avila v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 758 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014).  
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Police Department (LAPD) due to his testimony in a Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) lawsuit brought by a fellow officer.239  Avila 
brought an action against the LAPD and the City of Los Angeles 
(collectively, the City) for violations of the FLSA anti-retaliation 
provision.240  The jury found in favor of Avila and awarded 
attorney’s fees and liquidated damages.241  The City appealed the 
decision, claiming that Avila had been terminated for insubordination 
because he failed to claim overtime.242  The LAPD’s disciplinary 
body, the Board of Rights (BOR), had previously found Avila guilty 
of insubordination and recommended termination.243  The City 
argued that the BOR determination precluded Avila’s retaliation 
claim.244  The district court found that it did not, and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.245  The City also argued on appeal that the jury was 
not properly instructed; however, the Ninth Circuit found no 
reversible error and upheld the district court decision.246  
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling 
 
 Leonard Avila testified under subpoena in a FLSA suit brought 
by Edward Maciel against the City of Los Angeles.247  Maciel sought 
overtime pay for working through his lunch hour.248  Avila testified 
that it was common practice to work through lunch and not claim 
overtime.249  Avila stated that he, along with his supervisors, 
operated under an “unwritten policy of not claiming overtime for 
working through lunch.”250  After testifying in the FLSA suit, the 
LAPD brought an investigation against Avila and the other officer 
                                                            
239 Id. at 1098. 
240 Id. at 1099; see also 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012).  
241 Avila, 758 F.3d at 1105. 
242 Id. at 1099. 
243 Id.  
244 Id.  
245 Id. at 1100. 
246 Id. at 1099. 
247 Id.  
248 Id. 
249 Id.  
250 Id.  
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who testified, Richard Romney.251  Avila and Romney were ordered 
to appear at a BOR disciplinary hearing.252  On the day of the 
hearing, Avila resigned to accept a job offer with another law 
enforcement agency.253 The BOR continued the hearing against Avila 
without him present.254  The BOR ultimately determined that Avila 
was guilty of insubordination and recommended his termination.255  
Avila then brought an anti-retaliation charge against the City.256  The 
City moved for summary judgment, arguing the Avila’s FLSA claim 
was precluded because he never sought judicial review of the BOR 
decision.257  The jury found in favor of Avila and awarded him 
$50,000 in liquidated damages and $579,400 in attorneys’ fees.258 
The City appealed.259 
 State agency determinations are “entitled to preclusive effect if 
three requirements are satisfied: ‘(1) that the administrative agency 
act in a judicial capacity, (2) that the agency resolve disputed issues 
of fact properly before it, and (3) that the parties have an adequate 
opportunity to litigate.’”260  The City argued that Avila never 
properly appealed the BOR decision and that the agency 
determination should preclude his FLSA retaliation claim.261  The 
BOR constitutes a state administrative agency acting in a judicial 
capacity; however, the court of appeals found that because the BOR 
never addressed the issue of retaliation, there was no preclusion.262  
There was no resolution of the disputed issue: Avila’s claim that his 
termination was in retaliation for testifying in the Maciel trial.263   
                                                            
251 Id.  
252 Id.  
253 Id. 
254 Id.  
255 Id.  The BOR also fired Officer Romney.  Id. 
256 Id.  
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 1100. 
261 Id. at 1099. 
262 Id. at 1100. 
263 Id.  
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 On appeal, the City argued that the jury was not given proper 
instructions.264  The district court followed Ninth Circuit law by 
giving instructions to the jury that included the requirement for Avila 
to prove that his testifying at the Maciel trial was a motivating factor 
in his termination.265  The City attempted to include the “same 
decision” affirmative defense on appeal; however, because the briefs 
on appeal did not assert an error in the district court’s failure to 
include the “same decision” instruction, the Ninth Circuit found that 
the argument was waived.266  The City requested special instructions 
in the jury trial to support its argument that Avila was fired because 
he failed to request overtime and not because he testified.267  The 
district court refused the special instructions and the Ninth Circuit 
held that this refusal was not an abuse of discretion.268 
 Because the only evidence that Avila was failing to seek overtime 
pay was his testimony in the FLSA suit, the City could not avoid the 
retaliation claim.269  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding that Avila was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for 
testifying in Maciel’s FLSA suit.270  The Ninth Circuit also found no 
abuse of discretion in the award of attorneys’ fees or liquidated 
damages. 271 
 
Impact 
 
 Under most circumstances, claims against state agencies must 
follow the administrative procedure for appeals, and those 
administrative decisions would preclude an individual from bringing 
a further civil claim.272  However, the requirements for preclusion 
exist for a case such as this one.  While Avila may not have followed 
the proper procedure for appealing the BOR decision, the BOR 
                                                            
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 1101. 
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267 Id. at 1101. 
268 Id. at 1105. 
269 Id. at 1100. 
270 Id. at 1105. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 1100.  
    
602 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-2 
determination was made on improper grounds.  Anti-retaliation laws 
within the FLSA exist to protect employees from being punished for 
speaking up about labor law violations and to encourage employees 
to participate in FLSA lawsuits.273  The LAPD singled out the two 
individuals who testified at Maciel’s trial for a BOR investigation 
and wrongfully terminated their employment.274  The dissenting 
judge in this case did not find the “same decision” defense to be 
waived and found ample evidence to support that defense; however, 
the panel affirmed the district court’s decision and clarified the 
circumstances in which state administrative agencies do not preclude 
individuals’ FLSA claims.275  
 
Young v. United States, 
769 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2014) 
 
Synopsis 
 
 While visiting Mount Rainier National Park, Plaintiff Donna 
Young fell into a twelve-foot hole near the Park’s main visitor center 
and suffered serious injuries.276  The Young family brought suit 
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 
alleging that the National Park Service (NPS) was negligent in failing 
to warn of a hazard that it both knew of and created.277  The district 
court dismissed the Youngs’ claim, finding that the action was barred 
by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA because the 
decision to warn visitors of hazards of a general nature in the park 
was policy-driven and therefore protected.278  The Youngs 
appealed.279  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
decision not to warn of a known safety hazard was not a policy 
consideration that the discretionary exception was designed to 
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274 Id. at 1101.  
275 Id. at 1105.  
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protect.280  The court held that the Youngs’ claim was not barred and 
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.281   
 
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling 
 
In June 2010, Donna and her family visited Mt. Rainier National 
Park while on vacation in Washington.282  They arrived at the park in 
the early evening and decided to walk around near the visitor center 
before the park closed.283  Across the road from the visitor center was 
an empty field that was typically covered by snow for most of the 
year.284  There was a transformer that sat in the field and was used to 
power the visitor center building.285  The snowfall regularly covered 
the transformer, which released heat as it transferred electricity from 
nearby power lines to the visitor center.286  There was no sign or 
warning of the transformer’s presence, so when Donna Young 
walked over to the field, she fell twelve feet into a hole created by the 
melting snow around the transformer.287  She sustained severe 
injuries as a result of the fall.288   
The Youngs sued the United States under the FTCA.289  The 
FTCA allows individuals to recover money damages for injuries 
caused by negligent acts of government employees.290  The Youngs 
alleged that the NPS knew about the hazard, but negligently failed to 
warn visitors.291  The Government moved to dismiss the Youngs’ 
claim, arguing that the claim was barred by the discretionary function 
exception to the FTCA.292  Under the discretionary function 
exception, “[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance 
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or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty 
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, 
whether or not the discretion involved be abused,” does not receive 
waiver of immunity.293  
In order to determine whether the discretionary function 
exception applied to the NPS’s actions, the district court applied 
Berkovitz’s two-step inquiry.294   
 
Step One of the Berkovitz Test: Discretion 
 
In Berkowitz,295 the Court held that an act is discretionary if it is 
“a matter of choice for the acting employee,” and “involves an 
element of judgment or choice.”296  Therefore, the first step in the 
Berkovitz analysis is to determine “whether the decision at issue 
‘involve[d] an element of judgment or choice.’”297   
Here, the parties agreed that the decision not to place warning 
signs was discretionary because there was no established statute, 
regulation, or policy requiring or prohibiting warning signs.298  The 
decision not to place a sign was a matter of judgment for the Park 
Service staff.299   
 
Step Two of the Berkovitz Test: Policy  
 
The second step in the Berkowitz analysis requires determining 
whether the discretionary conduct was “of the kind that the 
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”300  In order 
to meet this standard, the decision must be “grounded in social, 
economic, and political policy.”301   
                                                            
293 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1680(a) (2012)). 
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295 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988). 
296 769 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). 
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Here, the parties’ dispute lies in the determination of whether the 
decision not to place warning signs at the site of the transformer was 
policy-driven.302  The purpose of this requirement is to protect 
administrative and legislative decisions from being second-guessed 
by the judiciary.303  The NPS was created under a statute that 
established “broad policy considerations that govern [the] NPS’s 
management of national parks.”304 The NPS’s management policies 
also require it to balance visitor safety against conservation and 
access.305  However, the policies do not protect all decision the NPS 
makes.306  Therefore, there must be some support that a particular 
NPS decision was “actually susceptible to analysis under the policies 
the government identified” for the discretionary function exception to 
apply.307   
While the decision not to provide warning signs on unmaintained 
trails or other natural hazards in national parks would likely fall 
within the policy requirement of the discretionary exception, the 
decision not to warn visitors of a latent safety hazard created by the 
park itself does not.308 Here, the transformer, and the snowmelt 
danger that it created, was created by the NPS, not by nature.309  
Therefore, the decision not to warn visitors of the transformer’s 
presence was not a policy decision requirement and thus failed the 
discretionary function exception.310  Under the FTCA, Plaintiffs’ 
claim was not barred, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s judgment.311 
 
Impact 
 
 This case allowed the Ninth Circuit to establish a clear distinction 
between discretionary actions that should be covered by the 
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discretionary function exception and those that should not.  The 
exception to the FTCA is important in order to protect government 
agencies from being subject to heavy judicial oversight of their 
management decisions.312  The NPS would likely be better suited to 
make decisions regarding trail maintenance and snow removal than 
the courts, however, the importance of individual safety at any 
government-run building, landmark, or park must be protected as 
well.313  This case established important precedent for applying the 
discretionary function exception by holding that the government is 
accountable for dangers created by government agencies.314  
Individuals can expect natural hazards in national parks, given that 
they are areas of preserved wilderness; however, if an injury is 
incurred due to an unexpected hazard created by the NPS, the 
government agency should be held accountable.315   
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